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DAMAGING THE SPECIAL INJURY RULE: A RESTRICTIVE HOLDING IN
OVERCASH V. SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2005, boaters across South Carolina enjoyed the Memorial Day
weekend by relaxing in various watercraft. As vacationers returned to work on
Tuesday, the South Carolina Supreme court issued a decision that should make
South Carolinians think twice before stepping on a boat. In Overcash v. South
Carolina Electric & Gas Co.,' the supreme court decided an individual plaintiff
cannot recover for personal injury under a public nuisance theory; instead, a
plaintiff can only recover for injury to property.'
"A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public."3 Some scholars have characterized the tort of public nuisance as
a largely incoherent collection of infiingements on public rights.' Recently,
however, the doctrine has regained prominence as the basis of liability in a variety
of actions ranging from corporate liability for pollution' to liability for handgun
manufacturers.6 Generally, only a governmental entity can sue under a public
nuisance theory,7 but some states, including South Carolina, have adopted a
"special injury" rule that allows an individual private plaintiff to bring a public
nuisance action.8 Under the special injury rule, a private plaintiff must show an
injury to himself that differs in kind from that of the general public.9
Although the special injury rule first appeared in the 1500s, ° courts today
continue to struggle when deciding what types of injuries constitute special
injuries." In Overcash II, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a bright-line
rule and decided that a private plaintiff can recover only for injuries to real or
personal property under a public nuisance theory, and thus a private party cannot
recover for personal injury. 2 The court examined the history of nuisance, as well
as South Carolina precedent, and concluded that allowing recovery for personal
1. (Overcash I), 364 S.C. 569, 614 S.E.2d 619 (2005).
2. Id. at 575, 614 S.E.2d at 622.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(l) (1979).
4. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 90, at 643-44
(5th ed. 1984).
5. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126 (MI. App. Ct. 2005)
(discussing the plaintiffs ability to recover for injuries caused by lead-based paint).
6. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (discussing
the plaintiffs ability to recover for handgun-related injuries).
7. See, e.g., Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theaters, Inc., 89 So.2d 537, 548 (Ala. 1956) (stating the
Alabama Attorney General may pursue injunctive relief).
8. See McMeekin v. Cent. Carolina Power Co., 80 S.C. 512, 515, 61 S.E. 1020, 1023 (1908);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 90, at 647.
9. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 90, at 647.
10. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash I), 364 S.C. 569, 573, 614 S.E.2d 619, 621
(2005).
11. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 90, at 647.
12. Overcash II, 364 S.C. at 575,614 S.E.2d at 622.
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injury under the special injury rule would "perpetuate the erosion of any semblance
of doctrinal consistency in the common law of nuisance."' 3 This Note argues the
supreme court improperly restricted the scope of the special injury rule, and neither
the development of nuisance law nor prior South Carolina precedent supports the
decision. A better rule would include personal injury in its scope, or in the
alternative, entirely abolish the private right of action.
Part II discusses the factual background and the court's analysis in Overcash
II. Because part of the court's reasoning rests on the historical development of
nuisance, Part III gives the necessary historical background on the development of
nuisance law. Part IV argues the court's reasoning does not support the adoption of
a rule that disallows recovery for personal injury but instead supports either a
narrow rule barring private action or a broader rule that allows recovery for
personal injury. Part V explains why a private cause of action for public nuisance
should exist and examines the proper standard of liability. Part VI argues the
private right of action in South Carolina should permit recovery for personal injury.
II. BACKGROUND OF Overcash II
A. Facts
In 1964, Sarah and Crawford Clarkson purchased a lot on Lake Murray.14 Later,
the Clarksons built a dock from their shoreline to an island, owned by South
Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G), located over 100 yards away. I"
SCE&G owns Lake Murray, subject to the regulation of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), 16 and has a duty to prevent unauthorized use of
the lake and the land surrounding the lake that sits below a certain water level. 7
The Clarksons' dock "constituted an unlawful obstruction of the navigable
waterway," and SCE&G had either actual or constructive notice of the dock.'"
On July 17, 1999, Karl Overcash, a twenty-four-year-old employee of Lake
Murray Marina, returned home from the marina by boat. 9 Overcash collided with
the Clarksons' unlit dock and suffered severe personal injuries to his upper body,
including blinding injuries to both eyes.2" Overcash sued both the Clarksons and
13. Id. at 575, 614 S.E.2d at 622.
14. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 1), 356 S.C. 165, 167, 588 S.E.2d 116, 118 (Ct.
App. 2003) [hereinafter Overcash 1], rev'd, 364 S.C. 569, 614 S.E.2d 619 (2005).
15. Id. at 167, 588 S.E.2d at 118.
16. Id. at 167, 588 S.E.2d at 118.
17. See Third Amended Complaint at 2-5, Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., No. 01-CP-40-223
(S.C. Ct. C.P. Oct. 5,2001). The complaint asserted the Clarksons built the dock on lands wholly owned
by SCE&G because the entire dock rests below the 360 foot contour line. Id. at 2-5. After several years,
SCE&G deeded the island to the Clarksons, and reserved the right to enforce covenants on its use. Id.
at 6-7. The record fails to clarify whether the Clarksons acquired title to the shoreline that abuts the
Clarksons' lot and is below the 360 foot contour.
18. Overcash I, 356 S.C. at 167-68, 588 S.E.2d at 118.
19. Id. at 168, 588 S.E.2d at 118.
20. Id. at 168, 588 S.E.2d at 118; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 8-9.
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SCE&G on multiple theories of recovery, including common law and statutory
public nuisance." The Clarksons settled with Overcash and SCE&G remained as
the lone defendant in the action.22
B. Procedural History
The Court of Common Pleas for Richland County granted SCE&G's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 3 The trial court reasoned, "All who forcefully
collide with an obstruction face the prospect of personal injury whether the
obstruction is on a public highway or a navigable stream."24 That statement implies
the trial court viewed Overcash's injuries as no different than those suffered by the
general public; therefore, Overcash could not satisfy the special injury rule. The
trial court also stated only damages for injury to real or personal property-and not
damages for personal injury-were recoverable.2 5 Finally, the court stated that
South Carolina Code section 49-1-10 did not allow a private right of action.26
The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.27 The court of
appeals found an earlier South Carolina case, Drews v. E. P. Burton & Co.,2 s
controlling, and stated section 49-1-10 provided a private right of action.29 The
court of appeals stated South Carolina law allows a private plaintiff to sue for
public nuisance, as long as the plaintiff suffered an injury different in kind than the
general public's injury.3" Applying this rule, the court of appeals held Overcash's
injury satisfied the special injury requirement.3 The court reasoned the public
injury was the illegal obstruction of a public waterway, not the possibility of
physical injury from collision.32 Overcash's physical injuries therefore differed in
kind from the public injury and satisfied the special injury rule.33 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that only injury to real or personal
21. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 1), 356 S.C. 165, 168, 588 S.E.2d 116, 118 (Ct.
App. 2003), rev'd, 364 S.C. 569, 614 S.E.2d 619 (2005). The South Carolina Code codifies the claim
for public nuisance at section 49-1-10, which states that a person who obstructs a navigable waterway
commits a nuisance. S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-1-10 (1976). The common law claim finds support in the
South Carolina Constitution, which states that all navigable waterways are common public highways.
S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
22. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash I!), 364 S.C. 569, 571, 614 S.E.2d 619, 620
(2005).
23. Id. at 571, 614 S.E.2d at 620.
24. Order at4, Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., No. 01-CP-40-0223 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Oct. 5, 2001).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 6; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-1-10.
27. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 1), 356 S.C. 165, 167, 588 S.E.2d 116, 117 (Ct.
App. 2003), rev'd, 364 S.C. 569, 614 S.E.2d 619 (2005).
28. 76 S.C. 362, 57 S.E. 176 (1907).
29. Overcash I, 356 S.C. at 168-69, 588 S.E.2d at 118.
30. Id. at 175, 588 S.E.2d at 122.
31. Id. at 177, 588 S.E.2d at 123.
32. Id. at 178, 588 S.E.2d at 124.
33. See id. at 178, 588 S.E.2d at 124.
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property satisfies the special injury requirement and that section 49-1-10 does not
provide a private right of action.34
C. The South Carolina Supreme Court's Analysis in Overcash II
The South Carolina Supreme Court found the trial court's reasoning
persuasive." The supreme court stated that personal injury is not compensable
under a public nuisance theory.36 Rather, only injury to property satisfies the special
injury requirement.37
The supreme court noted that it had never specifically ruled on whether
personal injuries satisfy the special injury requirement.3 8 The court began its
analysis with a short history of the development of nuisance law in England.39 The
Overcash II majority questioned the legitimacy of the special injury rule by
discounting its historical pedigree,' asserting the special injury rule derailed the
course of nuisance law.4' After recounting the special injury rule's questionable
pedigree, the majority narrowly construed the rule to apply only to injury to
property.42 The court announced that a narrow construction of the rule would
promote "doctrinal consistency in the common law of nuisance."' The majority
concluded that a narrow interpretation is entirely consistent with South Carolina
precedent because prior South Carolina cases had involved only injury to real or
personal property." In conclusion, the court stated that South Carolina law provides
other "tort-based doctrines" under which the plaintiff could recover for personal
injury.
45
IlI. A PRIMER ON NUISANCE AND THE SPECIAL INJURY RULE
There is no precise definition of nuisance, but Professors Prosser and Keaton
may have stated it best: "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the
entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance."'" The Overcash H/ court
announced a bright-line rule for the sake of "doctrinal consistency. ''4 Nonetheless,
34. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 1), 364 S.C. 569, 575-76, 614 S.E.2d 619,
622-23 (2005).
35. Id. at 575, 614 S.E.2d at 622.
36. Id. at 575, 614 S.E.2d at 622.
37. Id. at 575, 614 S.E.2d at 622.
38. Id. at 574, 614 S.E.2d at 621.
39. Id. at 573, 614 S.E.2d at 620-21.
40. See Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash fl), 364 S.C. 569, 573, 614 S.E.2d 619,
620-21 (2005).
41. Id. at 573, 614 S.E.2d at 621.
42. Id. at 573, 614 S.E.2d at 621.
43. Id. at 575, 614 S.E.2d at 622.
44. Id. at 573-74, 614 S.E.2d at 621.
45. Id. at 575, 614 S.E.2d at 622.
46. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 86, at 616.
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nuisance has confounded scholars and judges for centuries.4" The distinction
between personal injury and injury to property is only part of the confusion
surrounding nuisance law.49
A. The Historical Development of Nuisance Law
Early nuisance law resembled the modem tort of private nuisance, addressing
interferences with servitudes or a person's inherent right to use his land.5" The
"assize of nuisance," which remedied conduct occurring wholly on another's land,
appeared in the thirteenth century to complement the "assize of novel disseisin,"
which remedied a dispossession of land." To contrast the two remedies, one
commentator used a common example:52 Suppose a landowner built a dam on his
property that diverted water from his neighbor's property and the neighbor
demanded relief. 3 Because the damming did not dispossess the neighbor of his
land, the assize of novel disseisin provided no relief."4 Assize for nuisance remedied
the problem by requiring the landowner to abate the damming activity." Action
upon the case for nuisance soon replaced the assize for nuisance as the only action
at common law.56 Thus, this action became the "parent of the law of private
nuisance as it stands today."57
Nuisance began as a tort that provided relief for injury to real property rights.5
One commentator suggested that this direct link to property rights foreclosed any
possibility that lawyers at the time of the tort's inception could have conceived of
nuisance as a grounds for personal injury recovery.59 However, personal injury
recovery does not arise in an injury-to-property context; it typically arises in an
action for public nuisance that descends from the confluence of the private nuisance
action and an old English criminal writ.'
Public nuisance evolved from the civil action of private nuisance and from the
criminal writ of "purpresture."61 Purpresture remedied infringements on public
48. See P. H. Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189, 189-90 (1932); see also
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 86, at 617 ("[Tlhere has been a rather astonishing lack of any full
consideration of 'nuisance' on the part of legal writers.").
49. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 86, at 617 (noting that nuisance has come to mean the
invasion of various types of interests-and different kinds of conduct-by the defendant).
50. See Winfield, supra note 48, at 189.
51. See id. at 190; F. H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 LAwQ. REv. 480,481 (1949).
52. Winfield, supra note 48, at 190-91.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 191.
56. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 86, at 617.
57. Id.
58. Newark, supra note 51, at 482.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 482-83.
61. KEETONETAL.,Supra note 4, § 86, at 617.
2006]
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land-based rights, not private land-based rights.62 In England, purprestures were
encroachments upon land or highways owned by the Crown, and only the Crown
could prosecute the wrongdoer.6" Keeton suggested that a superficial similarity
existed between an interference with a public road and an interference with a
private drive."4 Thus, society began using the term "nuisance," which originally
encompassed only private rights, to encompass both public and private actions.6"
Initially, although common usage had corrupted the nomenclature, private nuisance
remained a tort and public nuisance remained a crime.66 English courts turned away
individual plaintiffs who claimed an action in nuisance for the blocking of a public
way.67 Courts refused private attempts to bring a public nuisance action because
public nuisance-or purpresture-was criminal, and only the Crown could
prosecute a criminal action.6" Until the 1530s, the tort-crime distinction separated
private nuisance from public nuisance.69
B. The Special Injury Rule
In the 1530s, the King's Bench rendered a decision that "set the law of
nuisance on the wrong track."7 In an anonymous case,7" an individual plaintiff sued
a defendant for blocking the public highway.72 The court disallowed the private
citizen's suit for this public injury.73 The majority opinion made an imprecise
statement of law: The court reasoned an individual could not bring a cause of
action, not only because the exclusive remedy was criminal, but also because a
private remedy would provide a cause of action to every citizen.7" The resulting
proliferation of claims would subject a defendant to multiple causes of action
62. Id. For a South Carolina case discussing purpresture, see Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C.
277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959).
63. KEETON ET AL., SUpra note 4, § 86, at 617.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Newark, supra note 51, at 482-83.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 483.
69. See id at 482.
70. Id. at 483.
71. See Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special
Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 790 (2001).
72. Newark, supra note 51, at 483 (citing Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, fol. 26, Mich. pl. 10 (1536) (Baldwin,
C.J.)).
73. Id. (citing Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, fol. 26, Mich. pl. 10 (1536) (Baldwin, C.J.)).
74. Id. (citing Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, fol. 26, Mich. pl. 10 (1536) (Baldwin, C.J.)).
[Vol. 57: 601
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stemming from one incident." To address the problem of multiple actions, Justice
Fitzherbert set forth the special injury rule.
7 6
Justice Fitzherbert wrote that an individual plaintiff may not sue in public
nuisance because it is a criminal proceeding "'unless it be where one man has
greater hurt or inconvenience than any other man had, and then he who had more
displeasure or hurt, etc., can have an action to recover his damages that he had by
reason of this special hurt.'" Justice Fitzherbert also gave the famous example of
a rider on horseback falling into a trench on a public highway.7" In the example, the
entire public suffered injury from the trench in the road, but the rider suffered
physical and, therefore, special injuries.79 The hypothetical soon moved its way into
the fabric of law, and shifted the character of public nuisance from a strictly
criminal proceeding to one that allows a private action for special injury.0
Public nuisance expanded incrementally, and soon began to cover any
interference with public rights-land-based or otherwise.8 Public nuisance became
a broad category of offenses, including interferences with public health, safety, or
convenience.8 2 In addition, plaintiffs began pleading public nuisance when the
underlying claims resembled ordinary negligence. 3 One commentator suggested
that plaintiffs hoped courts would broadly construe nuisance claims when
negligence was unworkable.84 Concern about the blending of nuisance and
negligence may have motivated the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in
75. Id. Overcash Iquotes the King's Bench reasoning in its opinion:
"It seems to me that this action does not lie to the plaintiff for the stopping of the
highway; for the King has the punishment of that, and he has his plaint in the
[criminal court] and there he has his redress, because it is a common nuisance to
all the King's [subjects], and so there is no reason for a particular person to have
an [action on his case]; for if one person shall have an action by this, by the same
reason every person shall have an action, and so he will be punished a hundred
times on the same case."
Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 1), 356 S.C. 165, 172, 588 S.E.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App.
2003), rev'd, 364 S.C. 569, 614 S.E.2d 619 (2005) (quoting Antolini, supra note 71) (alterations in
original).
76. See Newark, supra note 51, at 483 (citing Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, fol. 26, Mich. pl. 10 (1536)
(Fitzherbert, J.)).
77. Id.(quoting Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, fol. 26, Mich. pl. 10 (1536) (Fitzherbert, J.)).
78. Id. (quoting Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, fol. 26, Mich. pl. 10 (1536) (Fitzherbert, J.)).The entire
hypothetical reads:
"[If] a man make a trench across the highway, and I come riding that way by night
and I and my horse together fall in the trench so that I have great damage and
inconvenience in that, I shall have an action against him who made the trench
across the road, because I am more damaged than any other man."
Id. (quoting Y.B. 27, Hen. 8, fol. 26, Mich. pl. 10 (1536) (Fitzherbert, J.)).
79. See id. (quoting Y.B. 27, Hen. 8, fol. 26, Mich. pl. 10 (1536) (Fitzherbert, J.)).
80. See Newark, supra note 51, at 483-84.
81. See William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 998-99
(1966).
82. See id. at 1000-01.
83. See Newark, supra note 51, at 484-85.
84. Id. at 485.
2006]
7
Crouch: Damaging the Special Injury Rule: A Restrictive Holding in Overca
Published by Scholar Commons, 2006
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Overcash I. However, the supreme court's ruling that the special injury rule does
not apply to personal injurys does not necessarily promote doctrinal consistency.
C. The Justification for the Special Injury Rule
The special injury rule determines the plaintiff s standing to bring suit in public
nuisance.86 Commentators have posited two justifications for the rule: (1) to
prevent plaintiffs from harassing defendants with multiple actions arising out of a
single public wrong and (2) public injuries are generally minor inconveniences
when viewed from the perspective of an individual.87 These justifications imply
broader concepts. For example, the special injury rule enhances judicial
economy-multiple plaintiffs should not be allowed to clog courts' dockets with
actions arising out of the same conduct.88 Additionally, the law should not give a
remedy for every insignificant injury that results from nuisance: Instead, the injury
should have to reach some threshold level where a cause of action is appropriate.89
IV. THE Overcash II RULE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE COURT'S EXPRESSED
CONCERNS
The Overcash I court's reasoning does not support the rule it announced. The
supreme court announced doctrinal consistency in South Carolina nuisance law as
the primary motivation for the bright-line rule.9" Instead, the rule seems ill-advised
because the majority misinterpreted both the development of the common law and
the South Carolina precedent. A historical argument calls for the abolition of the
private right of action, while an analysis of modem precedent suggests that South
Carolina should permit recovery for personal injuries.
A. The Historical Argument
The Overcash 11 court spent two brief paragraphs discussing the development
of nuisance under the English common law.9 The court misunderstood the
development of public nuisance and improperly emphasized injury to real property
rather than focusing on the differences between the assize of nuisance and
purpresture.92 The court recounted how the two branches of nuisance were once
85. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 11), 364 S.C. 569, 574-75, 614 S.E.2d 619,
621-22 (2005).
86. See Prosser, supra note 81, at 1005.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt a (1979).
88. See Prosser, supra note 81, at 1007. Perhaps this states an argument for class action.
89. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
90. Overcash 11, 364 S.C. at 575, 614 S.E.2d at 622.
91. Id. at 573, 614 S.E.2d at 620-21.
92. Compare Overcash I, 364 S.C. at 573, 614 S.E.2d at 620-21 (distinguishing nuisance
proceedings by the nature of the protected property rather than the nature of the protected right), with
supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text (discussing assizes of nuisance and purpresture).
[Vol. 57: 601
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separate: one to protect private rights in real property, the other to protect the
public rights in public land.93 The court then noted the famous case that "derailed
the course of nuisance law... which once dealt only with harm to real property."'94
While technically correct, this statement does nothing to support the majority's
reasoning. The real property nexus only provides a possible explanation for
confusion of the two causes of action.95 Historically, the distinction rested in the
difference between the nature of the civil action and the nature of the criminal
action.96
Therefore, maintaining doctrinal consistency based on the historical
development of nuisance law should result in the restoration of the distinction
between the civil cause of action for private nuisance and the criminal action for
public nuisance.97 The original error in the development of nuisance law was not
the advent of the special injury rule-it was the judicial confusion between
nuisance and purpresture. 98 The clarification of the two actions would lead to the
consistency desired by the Overcash II court.9 9
Additionally, South Carolina precedent offers support for the historical
approach. In Sloan v. City of Greenville,'"° an individual plaintiff brought a cause
of action against a municipality to enjoin it from issuing a building permit to a
developer.'' The plaintiff alleged the proposed building would have created a
purpresture.'02 The citizen effectively forced the city-a public entity-to prevent
the purpresture before the building existed. 3 The Overcash 11 court could have
used Sloan to distinguish between private nuisance and purpresture and held that
only the state may sue for purpresture.
Critics of this argument may claim that public nuisance is broader than
purpresture and the state should not bar all private actions against public nuisance.
A private action for public nuisance protects certain common rights that may not
inhere in real property. 104 These critics may argue that because public nuisance
includes a variety of wrongful behavior, 'O a one-size-fits-all remedy could not
adequately address all wrongs.
However, the tort-crime distinction dispels these criticisms. While the same act
could be both a crime and a tort, the state has the power to craft the remedy for the
93. Overcash 11, 364 S.C. at 573-74, 614 S.E.2d at 620-21.
94. Id. at 573, 614 S.E.2d at 621.
95. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
99. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash fl), 364 S.C. 569, 575, 614 S.E.2d 619, 622
(2005)
100. 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959).
101. Id. at 279, 111 S.E.2d at 574.
102. Id. at 284, 289, 111 S.E.2d at 577, 579-80.
103. Id. at 284, 289, 111 S.E.2d at 577, 579-80.
104. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 81, at 1000-01 (discussing various types of public nuisance,
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act and may exclude tort liability. 0 6 While tort law is mainly compensatory,
criminal law serves to "protect and vindicate the interests of the public as a
whole."' °7 Therefore, the state could exclude private rights of action for public
nuisance and leave criminal action as the sole remedy while still protecting the
public welfare.
B. South Carolina Precedent
The Overcash II court could not justify its holding on a purely historical
argument. As the court indicated, South Carolina has adhered to the special injury
rule for decades.'0 8 The court may have felt bound by stare decisis °9 and, therefore,
was unwilling to abolish the special injury rule.
The Overcash II court asserted that previous South Carolina cases have
"avoided the uncertainty and confusion surrounding personal injuries in public
nuisance actions."" 0 The opinion did not state the source of the confusion, but
perhaps the difficulty arises from determining whether a certain injury qualifies as
a special injury. Scholars have recognized this difficulty."' Whatever the reason,
the court implied that incorporating personal injury into South Carolina's public
nuisance jurisprudence would wreak doctrinal havoc, and offered a bright-line rule
that disallows public nuisance actions based on a personal injury as a solution.'12
The court cited three cases to support its choice of a property-only special
injury rule.' Because the court based its ruling on a policy of doctrinal
consistency, the decisions that-in the court's view-support consistency require
closer scrutiny than they received in Overcash II."4 This investigation will show
that the property-only rule does not necessarily follow from the precedent the
Overcash II court relied on.
106. See Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 46, 198 S.E. 419,422 (1938).
107. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 2, at 7. Keeton further comments that the distinction between
criminal law and tort law rests in the protected interests and the remedies available at law. Id.
108. See Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash Ii), 364 S.C. 569, 573-74,614 S.E.2d 619,
621 (2005) (citing Burrell v. Kirldand, 242 S.C. 201, 203, 130 S.E.2d 470, 470 (1963); Huggin v.
Gaffhey Dev. Co., 229 S.C. 340, 342, 92 S.E.2d 883, 884 (1956); Crosby v. S. Ry. Co., 221 S.C. 135,
136, 69 S.E.2d 209, 209 (1952)).
109. See State v. One Coin-Operated Video Game Mach., 321 S.C. 176, 181, 467 S.E.2d 443,
446, (1996) (explaining consistency provided by stare decisis).
110. Overcash ff, 364 S.C. at 573, 614 S.E.2d at 621 (citing Burrell, 242 S.C. at 203, 130 S.E.2d
at 470; Huggin, 229 S.C. at 342, 92 S.E.2d at 884; Crosby, 221 S.C. at 136, 69 S.E.2d at 209).
111. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 90, at 647 ("Once this rule is accepted, however, the courts
have not always found it at all easy to determine what is sufficient 'particular damage' to support the
private action ... ").
112. Overcash II, 364 S.C. at 573-75, 614 S.E.2d at 621-22.
113. Id. at 573-74, 614 S.E.2d at 621(citing Burrell, 242 S.C. at 203, 130 S.E.2d at 470; Huggin,
229 S.C. at 342, 92 S.E.2d at 884; Crosby, 221 S.C. at 136, 69 S.E.2d at 209).
114. This Note discusses Burrell and Huggin in detail. Crosby does not warrant discussion
because the stated injury is similar to the injury at issue in Huggin.
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1. Burrell v. Kirkland"'
In Burrell, the plaintiff claimed the defendant obstructed a public road that
connected the plaintiff s property to a public highway." 6 The plaintiff sued under
a public nuisance theory, using the classic example of an obstructed highway, but
the court disposed of the case without ruling on the existence of a nuisance." 7 The
court recited a version of the special injury rule, stating that no private right of
action exists for a public nuisance absent special damages."' Because no special
damages existed, the plaintiff had no cause of action for public nuisance." 9
The Overcash 11 court used Burrell to justify the property-only special injury
rule despite the holding in Burrell that no special injury existed. The parenthetical
explanation of Burrell in Overcash II strained to make Burrell fit the public
nuisance mold.'2 The Overcash II majority stated that Burrell "requested [an]
injunction for his neighbors' obstruction of [a] public road."'' However, the
Burrell court was clear in noting the road in question was a private road-not a
public one-because only a limited class of people, as opposed to the general
public, used the road.'22
Further, Burrell was an adjoining property owner and asserted rights that are
generally indicative of private nuisance.2 3 While a nuisance can be both public and
private, 4 Burrell's status as a landowner, his assertion of an individual real
property right in the right to ingress and egress,' and the obstruction of a private
road makes Burrell a private nuisance case, though the plaintiff did not characterize
it as such. 6 The Overcash II court provided no analysis of Burrell. 7 Upon closer
inspection, Burrell, in which the court found no special injury or public nuisance,
does little to further the assertion that only an injury to property qualifies as a
special injury.28
115. 424 S.C. 201, 130 S.E.2d 470 (1963).
116. Id. at 203, 205, 130 S.E.2d at 470, 472.
117. Id. at 205, 130 S.E.2d at 472.
118. Id. at 204-05, 130 S.E.2d at 471-72.
119. Id. at 205, 130 S.E.2d at 472.
120. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash I), 364 S.C. 569, 573, 614 S.E.2d 619, 621
(2005).
121. Id. at 573, 614 S.E.2d at 621.
122. Burrell, 242 S.C. at 208, 130 S.E.2d at 473.
123. Burrell v. Kirkland, 242 SC. 201, 205-06, 130 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1963).
124. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 90, at 648.
125. See Brown v. Hendricks, 211 S.C. 395, 402, 45 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1947) (stating that a
property owner's right to access an adjacent street is appurtenant to the property).
126. See Burrell, 242 S.C. at 203, 130 S.E.2d at 470.
127. See Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash f/), 364 S.C. 569, 573,614 S.E.2d 619,621
(2005).
128. Id. at 575, 614 S.E.2d at 622.
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2. Huggin v. Gaffney Development Co.'2 9
Huggin centered on the obstruction of a public highway.13 The supreme court
recited the special injury rule, and unlike Burrell, held that Huggin met the special
injury requirement.' However, Huggin is problematic because the court confused
the nature of the protected right with the particular injury to the individual.' As
stated above, a private nuisance action alleges injury to a private property right,
which is a right that is appurtenant to land.' A public nuisance action alleges
injury to a right common to the public. 34 To sue for public nuisance, an individual
must "have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members
of the public exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject
of interference."' 35 The Huggin court confused these concepts in its analysis.
The Huggin court quoted Brown v. Hendricks:
"The right of the abutting property owner to access over the street
adjacent to his property as an appurtenance to his property, and to
have such access protected from material obstruction, has been
recognized by many of the courts, including our own. And it has
been held that an obstruction which materially injures or deprives
the abutting property owner of ingress and egress to and from his
property is a 'taking' of his property, for which recovery may be
had. And the fact that other means of access to the property are
available affects merely the amount of damages, and not the right
of recovery."136
Thus, the Huggin court seemed to discuss a private property right, particularly the
ingress and egress from one's own property. 37 If Huggin was suing to protect this
right, then the cause of action should have sounded in private nuisance. The right
to enter and leave one's own property is by nature not a right held in common with
the public.'38
The Huggin court further noted:
"These authorities are in line with the generally recognized
principle that a property owner has an easement in a street upon
129. 229 S.C. 340, 92 S.E.2d 883 (1956).
130. Id. at 342, 92 S.E.2d at 884.
131. Id. at 344-45, 92 S.E.2d at 884-85.
132. See id. at 345, 92 S.E.2d at 885.
133. See supra Part IH; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 87, at 619.
134. See supra Part hM; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 90, at 643.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979).
136. Huggin, 229 S.C. at 344, 92 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Brown v. Hendricks, 211 S.C. 395, 402,
45 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1947)).
137. Id. at 345, 92 S.E.2d at 885.
138. See Prosser,.supra note 81, at 1001-02 (distinguishing a public right from a private right).
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which his property abuts, which is special to him and should be
protected. While the owner of a lot on a public street has the same
right to the use of the street that rests in the public, he at the same
time has other rights which are special and peculiar to him; and
the right of ingress and egress is one of them. This right of access
is appurtenant to his lot, and is private property. To destroy that
right is to damage that property."
139
Again, the court upheld the public nuisance action while protecting a private
property right."4 Although the defendant obstructed a public street, by quoting
Brown, the court framed the argument in terms of the plaintiffs private property
right of ingress and egress.' 4' If Huggin simply confused the public and private
rights of the plaintiff, then Huggin provides no support for the special injury rule
announced in Overcash II because Huggin should have been a private nuisance
action.
Another possible reading of Huggin exists. The obstruction of a highway is a
public nuisance.'42 Huggin claimed a special injury from the obstruction of the
highway in the form of economic damage.4 3 Huggin also claimed that the
obstructed highway prevented him from procuring labor to pick his crops and cost
him $150.00 in crop loss.'" Huggin also claimed a diminution in value to his
property. 4" At first glance, this economic injury seems to satisfy the special injury
rule. However, even if Huggin satisfied the special injury rule, this decision does
not support the property-only rule from Overcash 1I. "
When considering the nature ofHuggin's injury, Huggin weakens the Overcash
II court's argument rather than strengthening it. Huggin claimed a dimunition in
value in his land. 47 Economic loss rests on the outer boundaries of compensable
injury in tort action. Indeed, "some states use the 'economic loss' rule to prohibit
all recovery of purely economic damages in tort."'" South Carolina allows recovery
for purely economic damages in tort, as long as the liability arises in tort and is
independent of a contractual duty.49 Allowing recovery for purely economic
injuries, as in Huggin, expands the scope of tort recovery, while Overcash Irs
139. Huggin v. Gaffney Dev. Co., 229 S.C. 340,345,92 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1956) (quoting Brown,
211 S.C. at 404, 45 S.E.2d at 607).
140. Id. at 345, 92 S.E.2d at 885.
141. Id. at 345, 92 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Brown, 211 S.C. at 402, 45 S.E.2d at 606).
142. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 86, at 617.
143. See Huggin, 229 S.C. at 343, 92 S.E.2d at 884.
144. Id. at 343, 92 S.E.2d at 884.
145. Id. at 343, 92 S.E.2d at 884.
146. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash fl), 364 S.C. 569, 575, 614 S.E.2d 619, 622
(2005).
147. Huggin v. Gaffiey Dev. Co., 229 S.C. 340, 343, 92 S.E.2d 883, 884 (1956).
148. See Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones, & Goulding, Inc., 320 S.C.
49, 54, 463 S.E.2d 85, 88 (1995) (citing Blake Constr. Co., v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724, 726 n.4 (Va. 1987)
(noting that some states do not allow recovery for economic damages in tort)).
149. See id. at 54-55, 463 S.E.2d at 88.
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property-only special injury rule narrows the scope by foreclosing recovery for
personal injuries. This dichotomy seems unjust.
In sum, the historical argument suggests foreclosing the private right of action
for public nuisance because of its criminal nature. 5 ' South Carolina precedent,
namely Burrell andHuggin, does notjustify the property-only rule because a proper
analysis shows these cases have only a tenuous link to public nuisance. A critical
analysis of the cases shows they promote rather than curtail "uncertainty and
confusion surrounding personal injuries in public nuisance actions," and therefore
do not support the doctrinal consistency that the Overcash 11 court sought.'
V. LLABILrrY AND USE OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION IN PUBLIC NUISANCE
Although the Overcash H court couched its decision in doctrinal consistency,
perhaps the court was hiding the driving force of the opinion in its short analysis
of Drews v. E. P. Burton & Co.'s2 Drews explores the interplay between nuisance
and negligence.' 3 The Overcash HI court's motivation may have come from a
concern that nuisance would subsume negligence if Overcash prevailed.'54 This part
explores the proper role of a private action for public nuisance in conjunction with
negligence.
A. A Discussion ofDrews
The plaintiff in Drews brought two causes of action: a nuisance claim and a
negligence claim."' The plaintiff accused the defendants of negligently leaving a
log in navigable waters causing injury to the plaintiff's schooner. 5 The plaintiff's
nuisance action arose out of a statute which read: "If any person shall obstruct the
same [navigable waters], otherwise than as hereinafter provided, such person shall
be deemed guilty of a nuisance.""'a' The court declared a plaintiff could recover for
both common law and statutory nuisance if he "sustain[ed] a special injury."'5 s
Thereafter, the court stated that if a person has an actionable nuisance claim, then
he need not prove negligence because the nuisance is "itself a wrongful act."' 59
150. See Prosser, supra note 81, at 999.
151. Overcash 11, 364 S.C. at 573, 614 S.E.2d at 621.
152. Overcash II, 364 S.C. at 574, 614 S.E.2d at 621 (citing Drews v. E. P. Burton & Co., 76 S.C.
362, 57 S.E. 176 (1907)).
153. Drews, 76 S.C. at 365-67, 57 S.E. at 177-78.
154. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
155. Drews, 76 S.C. at 366, 57 S.E. at 178.
156. Id. at 365, 57 S.E. at 177.
157. Id. at 366, 57 S.E. at 178 (citing S.C. CODE § 1335 (1902)).
158. Id. at 366, 57 S.E. at 178.
159. Drews v. E. P. Burton & Co., 76 S.C. 362, 366, 57 S.E. 176, 178 (1907).
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The Drews court provided that a person may recover for a public nuisance even
without negligence by the defendant.'" Theoretically, a plaintiff could recover for
injuries in a private right of action for public nuisance predicated on a strict liability
standard. Generally, strict liability attaches when an activity's abnormally high risk
outweighs its social value, or when even acting with due care does not reduce an
activity's inherent risk. 6' In response to Drews, the Overcash II court should have
framed the issue differently. Instead of focusing on the nature of the injury, a better
reasoned opinion would have established the proper use of a public nuisance action.
Prosser noted that liability in public nuisance may come from a statute, as well
as the other bases for general tort liability, "intent, negligence, or strict liability."'"
"Nuisance, in short, is not conduct, nor is it even a condition. It is the invasion of
an interest, a type of harm or damage, through any conduct which falls within the
three traditional categories of liability."' 63 Prosser's comments provide the proper
framework in which to analyze the usefulness of public nuisance.
Overcash sued because of an invasion of two types of interests: a personal
interest and a public interest. The court acknowledged that Overcash could
vindicate his personal interests though "well developed tort-based doctrines which
can redress wrongs resulting in personal injuries sustained by an individual."'" For
example, Overcash could have pled battery, and argued that SCE&G was
substantially certain that erecting the dock would cause a boater to collide with the
dock and suffer unwanted harmful contact.'65 Similarly, Overcash pursued a
negligence claim and argued that SCE&G breached a duty to him by allowing the
dock to be built and, therefore, proximately caused his injuries.' However, these
doctrines could onlyvindicate Overcash's personal interests. The dock also violated
a public interest, and public nuisance doctrine provides the mechanism to address
the violation of the public interest.
A public nuisance action allows Overcash to act as a private attorney general. 1
67
The private attorney general concept has appeared in several articles championing
the viability and liberalization of public nuisance. 6 While a state has limitedresources and cannot possibly prosecute all crimes, allowing citizens to act as a
160. Id. at 366, 57 S.E. at 178.
161. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 75, at 536-38 (discussing strict liability generally).
162. Prosser, supra note 81 at 1003.
163. Id. at 1004.
164. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash fl), 364 S.C. 569, 575, 614 S.E.2d 619, 622
(2005).
165. The trial court dismissed Overcash's general intentional tort claim. See Order Granting
Motion to Dismiss at 6.
166. Overcash also pled ordinary negligence. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at
12.
167. See Antolini, supra note 71, at 765.
168. See, e.g., id. ("Because public nuisance is a uniquely powerful tort, embodying a private
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private attorney general gives the state a dual benefit: crimes are prosecuted and
the state expends fewer resources to prosecute them. The special injury rule
satisfies the necessary standing requirement and ensures the plaintiff is a true
adversary of the criminal.
However, a problem may arise if a court requires a defendant to compensate
a private plaintiff-attorney general for individual injuries under a liability standard
less than negligence. Limiting recovery to a violation of a negligence standard in
a personal injury action while permitting recovery based on a strict liability
standard in a public nuisance action arising out of the same injuries could eviscerate
negligence law and undermine basic tort principles.
Conceivably, the state may have trouble fixing the liability standard because
of the interplay between negligence and intent in public nuisance actions. Prosser
discussed such an example in his article on public nuisance," 9 and the court could
have applied his ideas in Overcash R/ In Overcash I/, SCE&G may have acted with
intent in allowing the construction of the dock. To the extent SCE&G participated
in constructing the dock, it was substantially certain the dock would obstruct the
navigable waterway and thus cause a public nuisance. 7 ' However, SCE&G would
have had to foresee Overcash's particular incident.' Of course, creating the risk
may amount to negligence by SCE&G.
172
Prosser noted that a court could determine the proper balance of liability
resulting from the combination of a negligent violation of a private right and an
intentional conduct violation of a public right.1' This balance becomes important
because it affects the availability of certain defenses. While comparative negligence
is a defense in a negligence action, 1
74 it is not a defense to an intent-based tort.
7 5
The court, having read the Prosser article, 76 likely realized that several states have
barred contributory negligence as a defense in similar cases because of the
existence of intent.'7 If the Overcash II court did not want to adopt a similar rule,
it could have adopted a negligence standard of care for public nuisance actions and
allowed SCE&G to claim the comparative defense. Other states have held standard
negligence principles exist in a common law nuisance action, which would
presumably permit a comparative negligence defense.178 However, the Overcash 11
169. See Prosser, supra note 81, at 1023-24.
170. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 8, at 34-37 (discussing the meaning of intent
in an intentional tort).
171. See id.
172. See Prosser, supra note 81, at 1024.
173. See id.
174. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 67, at 468-79 (discussing comparative
negligence).
175. See generally id. § 67, at 478 (discussing intentional conduct).
176. See Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 17), 364 S.C. 569, 573,614 S.E.2d 619,620
(2005).
177. See Prosser, supra note 81, at 1024-25.
178. See, e.g., Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 646 N.W.2d 777, 792-93
(stating that liability can originate in negligence).
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court did not address the liability question but framed the discussion in terms of the
special injury rule.""
VI. SOUTH CAROLINA SHOULD ALLOW RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
South Carolina's version of the special injury rule should allow recovery for
personal injuries. The special injury rule protects the defendant from defending
multiple actions based on the same claim, while allowing the plaintiff to recover for
a personal injury.' If many plaintiffs attempt to recover individually for common
injuries, those injuries may not represent the full extent of the public injury or
adequately protect the general public's rights and interests. However, requiring a
special injury ensures that any potential claim for harm is real and that the plaintiff
can properly assert a common right because of his interest in the individual right.'8 '
The special injury rule ensures that the individual plaintiff will also act competently
as a private attorney general. 2
The special injury rule is a necessary standing tool which provides for proper
vindication of public rights.'83 Holding that a plaintiff can properly assert his rights
only when his property interests are injured and not when he suffers personal injury
is not doctrinally consistent. Thus, the Overcash II holding runs counter to its own
justification. '
The court of appeals began its analysis by stating that the special injury rule is
deeply rooted in American jurisprudence.'85 While the court of appeals noted that
South Carolina had no bright-line rule regarding standing by way of personal
injury, it found other jurisdictions' rules allowing such recovery persuasive.8 6 The
court of appeals also emphasized the special injury rule's requirement that the
injury must be different in kind than the general harm. 7 The court of appeals
reviewed earlier cases and concluded that Overcash's personal injuries differed in
kind from the general injury of obstruction of a public waterway. 8 Additionally,
the court of appeals noted the trial court's improper emphasis on prior cases
involving only injury to property. 9 Though other cases involved only property
injury, recovery for personal injury should not necessarily be foreclosed; rather, a
court should simply approach the personal injury issue as novel. 9
179. Overcash I, 364 S.C. at 573-75, 614 S.E.2d at 620-22.
180. See Prosser, supra note 81, at 1007.
181. See id.
182. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
183. See Prosser, supra note 81, at 1007.
184. See id.
185. See Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 1), 356 S.C. 165, 175, 588 S.E.2d 116, 122
(Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 364 S.C. 569, 614 S.E.2d 619 (2005).
186. Id. at 175-76, 588 S.E.2d at 122-23.
187. Id. at 175, 614 S.E.2d at 122.
188. Id. at 177-81, 588 S.E.2d at 123-25.
189. Id. at 179-81, 588 S.E.2d at 124-25.
190. See id. at 175-76, 588 S.E.2d at 122 ("[O]nly a limited body of South Carolina case law
exists which even tangentially discusses the issue now before us.")
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Nevertheless, the supreme court disagreed and ruled a plaintiff can only show
special injury by injury to property."m1 However, the court of appeals decision
presents an analysis that includes personal injury under the rule. The court of
appeals recognized that other jurisdictions have workable models that allow
recovery for personal injury" and the special injury rule is merely a standing
rule.'93 Therefore, the emphasis should not be on the nature of the injury but
whether the individual injury differs from the general injury. Courts are free to
"adopt that rule which in [their] judgment best conforms to the principles of equity
and which will tend to the furtherance of justice."' 94 Even though the South
Carolina Supreme Court was free to adopt a rule that includes personal injury, it
chose not to do so.
VII. CONCLUSION
South Carolina adopted a special injury rule that is overly formalistic and
inconsistent with the rule's function as a tool to determine standing. The court's
logic is short, unobvious, and omits necessary discussion of the real underlying
issue: liability. The court's bright-line rule forecloses recovery under the doctrine
of public nuisance for plaintiffs with actual personal injuries. While a rule including
personal injuries is more doctrinally consistent and accepted in most jurisdictions,
South Carolina chose to unnecessarily restrict the special injury test and, in this
case, reward a wrongdoer.
J. Kevin Couch
191. Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 11), 364 S.C. 569, 575, 614 S.E.2d 619, 622
(2005).
192. See Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Overcash 1), 356 S.C. 165, 176-77,588 S.E.2d 116,
122-23 (Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 364 S.C. 569, 614 S.E.2d 619 (2005).
193. See id. at 175, 588 S.E.2d at 122.
194. Johnson v. Johnson, 194 S.C. 115, 119, 8 S.E.2d 351, 352 (1940).
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